Europe and Human Dignity. A Steinian Discussion of Josef Ratzinger's Understanding of Europe by Lebech, Mette
STUDIA NAUK TEOLOGICZNYCH
TOM 12 (2017)
DOI 10.24425/119348
METTE LEBECH  
Maynooth University/Ireland
EUROPE AND HUMAN DIGNITY.  
A STEINIAN DISCUSSION  
OF JOSEPH RATZINGER’S UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPE1
INTRODUCTION
Benedict XVI’s Europe Today and Tomorrow2 charts the formation and his-
tory of Europe around a mission to reign as a sacred duty, manifested first in 
the reign of Charlemagne and in the idea of a Holy Roman Empire, and then 
transposed through many schisms, wars, divisions and crises into the duty to in-
sist on respect for Human Dignity. Benedict XVI thinks this mission to reign as 
a sacred duty is Christian in origin and that its transformation into an insistence 
on respect for Human Dignity also is. It is Ratzinger’s concern, as he charts the 
history of Europe, that we would be able on the one hand to face the future of 
Europe without loss of identity and on the other distinguish between what is 
oppressive and what is life giving in European culture3.
If Ratzinger is right that the mission to reign as a sacred duty translates into 
a mission to respect and protect Human Dignity by a process of concentrating 
on the essential, the two are essentially linked. If, moreover, the fundamental 
1 An earlier version of this paper was given at the Wroclaw International Conference Edyta 
Stein 2016: Europe and its Identity, Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wroclaw, Department of Hu-
manities and Social Sciences University of Wroclaw and Society of Edith Stein in Wroclaw, Edith 
Stein Haus, 15 October 2016. A German version of that paper is submitted for publication in the Ger-
man section of the proceedings of this conference, edited by Jerzy Machnacz. This present version 
has been restructured and expanded significantly by taking account of a more extensive selection of 
J. Ratzinger’s works. It consequently comes to an adjusted conclusion.
2 J. Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, San Francisco: Ignatius Press 2007, translated 
from the Italian original Europa: I suoi fondamenti oggi e domani, Cinisello Balsamo (Milan): 
Edizioni San Paolo 2004, second ed. 2005. As the book is written before Ratzinger became Pope but 
translated and published after, I shall refer to the book’s author intermittently as Joseph Ratzinger 
and Pope Benedict XVI. 
3 This is a theme that is prominent already in J. Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa? Diagnosen 
und Prognosen zur Lage von Kirche und Welt, Einsiedeln-Freiburg: Johannes Verlag 1991.
234 METTE LEBECH 
value of Human Dignity is objective, a priori and therefore eternal (not in its 
realisation, but in its essential being, as Stein will tell us), then the mission to 
reign for the sake of Human Dignity is rooted in a realm that does not pass, as 
also Ratzinger asserts, in the fundamental value of Human Dignity. This anchor-
age would mean that it would not be rational for us to renounce the attempt to 
pursue the mission for fear of losing our identity, since the identity results from 
the pursuit of the mission in whatever way it turns out to be possible. 
I shall argue here that we on this account of Europe can envisage Europe’s 
unfolding into the future while at the same time accept the possibility of a pro-
gressive absorption of less essential aspects of its cultural identity into a plurality 
of ethnic, religious and secular cultures. We can do this if we consider the letting 
go of non-essential aspects of the mission to reign for the sake of Human Digni-
ty as a concentration on it. As the idea of Human Dignity moreover constitutes 
a criterion for distinguishing between what is good and what is not in European 
culture, the concentration on the mission is simultaneously a strategy for internal 
renewal. I shall argue with Stein that such a mission to reign for the sake of Hu-
man Dignity has a community creating function that can explain the formation 
of Europe as well as its role in the world. 
In what follows, I shall first give an account of Ratzinger’s history of Europe 
(1). I shall then concentrate on the mission at the heart of it according to Ratzing-
er, and explain why, in Stein’s view, such a mission would be particularly suited 
for shaping a people and a continent (2). Finally, I shall discuss Ratzinger’s un-
derstanding of Human Dignity in the light of Stein’s understanding of values (3).
1. RATZINGER’S HISTORY OF EUROPE
Europe, according to Ratzinger, is ‘a geographical concept only in a way 
that is entirely secondary. It is not a continent that can be comprehended neatly 
in geographical terms; rather it is a cultural and historical concept’4. Ratzinger 
understands this concept to be comprehensible only within the context of the 
global challenges of our time and insists that its purpose is to sharpen our vision 
of what is helpful and what is harmful5. He proposes a concept that, like that of 
the nation, captures something spiritual involved with a group of people and 
with a landscape, a concept of political geography. It is, of course, a concept with 
which we are all familiar, whether within or outside of Europe.
4 J. Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 7-8.
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Ratzinger traces this concept’s history from Herodotus (484-425 BC) who 
claimed that ‘Asia, with all the various tribes of barbarians that inhabit it, is re-
garded by the Persians as their own; but Europe and the Greek race they look on 
as distinct and separate’6. In this statement ‘the boundaries of Europe itself are 
not specified, but it is clear that lands which today are the nucleus of modern Eu-
rope lay entirely outside of the area considered by the ancient historian. Indeed, 
with the establishment of the Hellenic states and the Roman Empire, a continent 
had been formed that became the basis for later Europe, although it displayed 
entirely different boundaries: these were the lands surrounding the Mediterra-
nean, which by virtue of their cultural ties, by dint of trade and commerce, and 
by reason of their common political system formed altogether a true and proper 
continent. Only the triumphant advance of Islam in the seventh and eighth Cen-
tury drew a boundary across the Mediterranean and, so to speak, cut it in half, so 
that all that had been one continent until then was thenceforward subdivided into 
three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe’7.
As the southern borders moved north through the Muslim conquests, Europe 
saw a vigorous growth towards the north, including lands that from now on 
became heartlands: Gaul, Germany and Britain, extending further into Scan-
dinavia. The continuity despite the displacement was ‘assured by a theological 
interpretation of history: in connection with the Book of Daniel, the Roman Em-
pire – renewed and transformed by the Christian faith – was considered to be the 
final and permanent reign in the history of the world in general, and therefore 
the association of peoples and states that was taking shape was defined as the 
permanent Sacrum Imperium Romanum. This process of a new historical and 
cultural definition was completed quite deliberately during the reign of Charle-
magne, and here the ancient name of Europe emerged once again, in a significant 
variation: this term was now used precisely to designate the kingdom of Char-
lemagne, and it expressed simultaneously the awareness of the novelty and the 
continuity with which the new association of states presented itself as the polit-
ical power in charge of the future. In charge of the future because it considered 
itself to be in continuity with the history of the world thus far and ultimately to 
be rooted in what lasts forever. Expressed in the self-understanding that was de-
veloping in this way was an awareness of being definitive and at the same time 
an awareness of having a mission’8.
Ratzinger continues to trace the history of Europe by including its ‘second 
root’, the non-western part of Europe, arising from the Byzantine Empire and 
stretching as far as Siberia. He sees interestingly Siberia as the first colony of 
Europe, i.e. as the first territory outside of Europe, which, although populated by 
6 Ibid., p. 12.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 13-14.
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Europeans, nevertheless is not having a status as a subject of history or indeed 
as a part of Europe. This concept of an outreach of the mission into lands out-
side the domain of active sovereignty came to represent a type of outreach that 
was to be repeated. Other colonies followed, after the Reformation had drawn 
a different kind of boundary across Western Europe, and eventually the United 
States formed itself into an independent historical subject now facing Europe. 
Becoming independent also was a pattern followed by many other former colo-
nies, although not by Siberia so far.    
Against the backdrop of national states forming the one definitive sover-
eignty issuing from the one sacred mission to reign lost currency. ‘The dramatic 
consequences of this are evident in the fact that the great European nations con-
sidered themselves entrusted with a universal mission, which necessarily led to 
conflicts among them, the deadly impact of which we have painfully experienced 
in the century that just ended’9. The pluralisation of the one mission led to each 
nation state pursuing the mission on its own. Its by-product was a competition 
for sovereignty and therefore war. 
Ratzinger identifies a totalitarian impulse operative within or alongside the 
sacred duty to reign as this latter was interpreted by Emperors and Popes. This 
impulse ‘always remained alive’ in the East and the West alike10. It is possibly 
present in the impulse to reign as such: Ratzinger seems to consider it as a com-
petitor to it, one opposed to it by the fact that it is not rendered sacred by its 
intention to protect Human Dignity11. It may be that the competition with this 
unholy impulse, with power as such, is the main factor to challenge our identity 
presently and in general. This impulse might ‘win’ in the sense of dominating 
the lands hitherto referred to as Europe, and it possibly could do so by promoting 
misconceptions of the idea of Human Dignity. The mission to rule for the sake 
of Human Dignity is not susceptible to be lost, however, as it is rooted in a realm 
that does not pass. As such, it lies open to move anyone susceptible to feel the 
motivating power of the value and willing to act accordingly by making it to be 
the point of their exercise of power.
Ratzinger identifies this mission as Christian in origin, and indeed sees the 
factual development of Christianity as the reason why the mission took root in 
9 Ibid., p. 21-22.
10 Ibid., p. 17.
11 In Wendezeit für Europa? (p. 95) Ratzinger claims that if the state is not based on justice, 
it regresses to be a band of robbers. Whether Ratzinger upholds this normative concept of the state 
in Europe Today and Tomorrow is unclear. That the basis for a politics in accordance with Human 
Dignity is justice (Wendezeit für Europa?, p. 99) and that thus the claim to rule in accordance with 
Human Dignity certainly does allow for the state to form, based on justice, is clear already from 
Wendezeit für Europa?. Stein does not have a normative concept of the state; to her, a state can exist 
as totalitarian. As it as such has negative value, the state does not itself have a value. It is possible 
that the Ratzinger of Europe Today and Tomorrow would tend to agree with her. 
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the lands we today call Europe. The mission is in what it accomplishes similar to 
the a-historical idea of a society ruled by law, presented by Habermas as relying 
on the principle of Human Dignity12. However, it is not identical to it, in that the 
mission to reign for the sake of Human Dignity comes both with the motivating 
power of the value of Human Dignity and with the express calling or task to 
provide leadership for the sake of it by an authority mostly understood to be 
transcendent. The mission thus is the task of establishing and re-establishing the 
reign of a principle, whereas the constitutional state of law, however supported 
by procedures and democracy, does not by itself have the power to regenerate 
and renew itself whenever the constitution and democracy becomes compro-
mised by the pursuit of power. 
In his debate with Habermas Ratzinger speaks of two cultures of the West, 
which he refers to as the Christian faith and secular rationality13. Ratzinger’s 
identification of the sacred mission to reign with the task to rule for the sake 
of Human Dignity stands in some contrast with this. In Europe Today and To-
morrow, he sees in Christianity the driving force and in the secular state of law 
a by-product, or indeed a result. Whether referred to as a relationship of comple-
mentarity or polarity the recognition of distinct legitimate spheres for religion 
and a secular state is characteristic of the culturally Christian sphere of the West-
ern world. 
If seen in the light of the idea that the mutual interaction between Greek 
thought and Judaism prepared the event of Christianity as the Christians ex-
pressed their central belief through the Greek language and presented the Messi-
ah as the Logos, it may be possible to see the re-separation of secular rationality 
and Christianity as something that occurred with the Enlightenment14. However, 
for the formative years of Europe, the traditions were not distinct, and thus ‘this 
inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical enquiry 
was an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history 
of religions, but also from that of World history – it is an event which concerns 
us even today. Given this convergence, it is not surprising that Christianity, de-
spite its origins and some significant developments in the East, finally took on 
its historically decisive character in Europe. We can also express this the other 
12 See J. Habermas, J. Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularisation. On Reason and Religion, ed. 
F. Schuller, transl. B. McNeill, C.R.V., San Francisco: Ignatius Press 2006.
13 Ibid., p. 75.
14 In his Regensburg address (September 12, 2006) Benedict XVI says: „The encounter be-
tween the Biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by chance. The vision of Saint Paul, 
who saw the roads to Asia barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead with him: «Come 
over to Macedonia and help us!» (cf. Acts 16.6-10 [8]) – this vision can be interpreted as a «dis-
tillation» of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between biblical faith and Greek enquiry”. 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_
spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html, p. 3 of 8.
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way around: this convergence, with the subsequent addition of the Roman her-
itage, created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called 
Europe’15. 
2. HOW A MISSION TO REIGN CAN SHAPE A CONTINENT
Ratzinger’s account of the formation and history of Europe fits well with 
Edith Stein’s analysis of the state as a social reality16. Europe is not, of course, 
quite, or yet, a ‘state’ in the sense of ruling out ‘national’ sovereignty, although 
some complain that it is in fact a super state, and that it does precisely overrule 
national sovereignty. What we can see today, and maybe could see since the 
formation of Europe, is both a competition between and a co-ordination of sov-
ereignties in Europe, in a way that is both preparative for integrating them in the 
higher sovereignty of Europe and allowing for the possibility that Europe can 
fall apart along ethnic or religious fault lines.
Stein regards the state as: 
1. incorporating a community; 
2. being sovereign by the making of positive law, and 
3. existing in a global context as a subject of history17.
Both Europe and its member states can be said to have these characteristics, 
depending on where one recognises the sovereignty to lie as regards particular 
matters, and thus both can be recognised as states in so far as they are sovereign18. 
15 Ibid., p. 4 of 8 [10]).
16 E. Stein, An Investigation Concerning the State, ed. and transl. M. Sawicki, (Collected Works 
of Edith Stein vol. X) Washington D.C.: ICS Publications 2006. Translated from Eine Untersuchung 
über den Staat, now critically edited by I. Riedel-Spangenberger and published in Edith Steins Ge-
samtwerke, Bd. 7, Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder, 2006. For the various types of social formation see 
also E. Stein, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, ed. M. Sawicki, transl. M. C. Baseh-
eart, M. Sawicki, (Collected Works of Edith Stein vol. VII) Washington D.C.: ICS Publications 2000. 
Translated from Beiträge zur philosophschen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissen-
schaften, now critically edited by B. Beckmann-Zöller and published in Edith Steins Gesamtwerke, 
Bd. 6, Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder 2010. Please also see M. Lebech: „Study Guide to Edith Stein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities” in Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society 2004, 
ed. M. Lebech, Maynooth: NUI 2004, p. 40-76. To be reprinted in a revised and expanded version 
by ICS Publications. 
17 An Investigation Concerning the State, I, §1, §2, §3 and II, §5.
18 The United States of America display a similar structure: the individual states are sovereign 
in some limited matters, whereas the federal government is in others. The member states in Europe 
have retained not only a much larger cultural diversity, but also a more significant autonomy than is 
the case in the United States of America. 
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A state, for Stein, is a ‘sovereignty’ in that it legislates, and in that it is constitut-
ed by its subjects as theirs, either directly or because of their ethnic, cultural or 
religious loyalty to a group, whose state it is. It is thus not essentially bound to 
a specific territory (although it is bound to some territory because of the needs 
of its subjects), but instead to a set of reasons that makes its subjects identify it 
as of importance for them and for others, and/or as legitimate. It depends on the 
subjects’ identification of themselves and of their solidarity with various types 
of people and cultures, whether they consider a state ‘their’ state, and how im-
portant they consider it to be. The subjects can consider themselves and the state 
obliged by principles or values. The state cannot do so by itself, since it knows 
of values only through the people making it up. However, a state may adopt and 
have a constitution that binds it to principles to which the subjects may appeal 
and which forms the basis for its state of law. 
A sovereignty shaped by a sacred mission to reign in order to safeguard 
Human Dignity would seem for most people to be in their interest since such 
a sovereignty would be bound to respect the principle of Human Dignity and 
therefore them. However, the fact that it is a mission adds the dimension that 
someone else in authority over and above the state, whether God or the human 
being itself, recognises the value of Human Dignity and has commissioned ‘us’ 
(and therefore the state) to commit to the realisation of the principle. This aspect 
underlines the responsibility of the subjects for the state, as only their commit-
ment will commit the state through its constitution to respect Human Digni-
ty. Those individuals who consider themselves bound by other human beings, 
even if not by God, can share in this responsibility and maybe even consider it 
a mission. The mission thus underlines the responsibility to God or others over 
and above the state for the commitment to a value He and they also value, and 
which He and they can be counted on to assist in realising. A sovereignty bound 
by such a mission might command considerable support in terms of subjects 
who would find this mission something with which they could identify, and as 
something, they themselves would be prepared to pursue or value and hence at-
tempt to realise by their actions. It is difficult to imagine anything that could be 
more in the interest of all and more legitimate in the view of all, even if it is at 
the same time very demanding19. In so far as this is the ideal sovereignty that in 
fact makes us identify Europe with all its concrete ethnic, religious and cultural 
loyalties, it reaches into the sphere of what does not pass. It might well for this 
reason precisely be destined not to be associated exclusively with a particular 
set of ethnic, religious and cultural loyalties, but to transcend them all. If it is 
not this ideal that makes us identify Europe, but instead geographical, ethnic or 
cultural features not related to this ideal, then Ratzinger’s account of Europe is 
19 The state of law referred to by Habermas as relying on Human Dignity could correspond to 
this. J. Habermas and J. Ratzinger: The Dialectics of Secularisation.
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in need of completion or indeed incorrect. On Ratzinger’s account, however, and 
it is not impossible that most Europeans would agree with him, cultures are or 
can be called European to the exact extent that they are in conformity with this 
mission. However, it may well be unclear to many what exactly Human Dignity 
means and to what it refers. It seems that Ratzinger counts among these, in so 
far as his concept of Human Dignity, as can be seen from the following, is not 
completely clear.
3. RATZINGER’S UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN DIGNITY  
IN THE LIGHT OF STEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUES
Ratzinger raises the question of: ‘what is capable of keeping alive the in-
trinsic identity of Europe through all the historical metamorphoses. […] to put 
it even more simply: What is there, today and tomorrow, that promises human 
dignity and a life in conformity with it?’20 
If these words are not to be taken as an expression of mere desperation, one 
can interpret them, as I have done so far, to signify the progressively conscious 
identification of the sacred mission to reign with the mission to protect Human 
Dignity (i.e. with the mission to create conditions in which Human Dignity is 
respected). The awareness of the sacred mission would thus include an intrinsic 
but implicit understanding of the idea that the ideal of a sacred reign is for the 
sake of Human Dignity. Such an ideal and mission does represent a promise for 
today and tomorrow. Institutions and customs formed and reformed by attention 
to this ideal are needed to protect Human Dignity concretely, but once the ideal 
is presented, such institutions and customs can be realised by those who are re-
sponsive to it, whoever that might be. 
However, Ratzinger also claims that ‘Faith in God the Creator is the surest 
guarantee of man’s dignity’21. By this he cannot really mean that our faith in 
Christ would or could guarantee the ideal existence of the value of Human Dig-
nity, in so far as it as a value as such resides in a realm beyond our valuation, 
a ‘realm that does not pass’22. God is himself the only possible guarantee of the 
20 J. Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, p. 26.
21 Ibid., p. 43.
22 J. Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa?, p. 108: „Gerade nach dem ungeheuren Missbrauch des 
Rechtspositivismus im Führerrecht des Dritten Reiches, in dem Unrecht Gesetz geworden und der 
Staat zur Rauberbande degradiert worden war, war man sich bewusst, dass jede Rechtsetzung auf 
Werte gegründet sein muss, die sich unserer Manipulation entziehen. Deren unbedingte Achtung 
gibt erst der Freiheit des Entscheidens ihre Würde und ihrern tragenden Grund. Deshalb weiss das 
Grundgesetz auch um die Grenzen des Mehrheitsprinzips. Und es weiss, dass diese Unantastbarkeit 
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essential being of values such as Human Dignity, in so far as they can be likened 
to Ideas present in Him, in the Logos, before the beginning of the world. 
As a value, however, Human Dignity is in need of realisation in the world, 
i.e. it is in need of being realised (i.e. valued and acted upon) by human beings, 
without which it will remain ideal, and not inform human relationships. Human 
beings need to respect Human Dignity in order to guarantee its realisation by 
them: God cannot do that for us, because it is precisely in respecting it that we 
realise it. 
It is possible that faith in the Creator, as far as it involves appreciation for the 
value of human beings as it clearly does in the case of the Christian faith, goes 
some way to encourage the realisation of the value of Human Dignity by us. It 
does not guarantee this realisation, however, as is all too evident from believ-
ers in the Creator or indeed Christians engaged in activities that do not respect 
Human Dignity. The totalitarian tendency can take root because we cannot guar-
antee the value response of others, and, realistically, even of ourselves, sinners 
as we are. Believing God has commissioned us to reign for the sake of Human 
Dignity, however, allows us to know that God is interested in the realisation of 
Human Dignity and that He therefore will help us to realise it. To accept the 
mission from Him makes it meaningful to implore Him for His assistance for 
the task.
If we cannot guarantee our prioritisation of Human Dignity, it is because we 
are also enamoured of other values. Such values as progress, science and free-
dom present challenges to Human Dignity23, in that they might be preferred to 
Human Dignity in practise and not only in theory. Whether we do this is in our 
hands to the extent that we can convince ourselves and others. It is possible to 
be distracted from this task by manipulations of the concept of Human Dignity, 
presenting it to us, for example, as a meaningless concept.
When Ratzinger says that ‘The inviolable nature of human dignity ought to 
become the fundamental untouchable pillar of ethical regulations’24, one could 
regard it as an attempt to exorcize distorted expressions of the idea, and to for-
mulate Human Dignity in a way that is not subject to demagogical manipula-
tions. Human Dignity, as far as it is a dignity, means that it is first among values 
(i.e. that it has other values following on from it) and that it therefore should 
be preferred to these other values following from it precisely because they do 
follow from it. By saying that Human Dignity ‘ought’ to be a pillar of ethical 
regulations, Ratzinger probably means that it ought to function as the basic prin-
ciple of inter-human relationships, because it is highest among values by virtue 
von Werten, die allein die Unantastbarkeit der Würde des Menschen und so seine Freiheit schützt, 
darauf gründet, dass es diese Werte wirklich gibt und das wir vor ihnen Verantwortung tragen“.
23 J. Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, p. 62-63.
24 Ibid., p. 42.
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of it being a dignity. What he therefore insists on with this statement is that Hu-
man Dignity ought to be respected for what it is: a fundamental value entitling 
human beings to respect as such, a fundamental value motivating human beings 
to respect each other25.
When Ratzinger further says: ‘The inviolability of human dignity means also 
that this dignity is valid for everyone, that it has a human face and belongs bio-
logically to the human race’26, he reiterates that Human Dignity means the dignity 
that pertains to human beings as such (and therefore belongs to the human race 
as such). That dignity belongs ‘biologically’ probably is intended to mean that it 
pertains to each individual belonging to the biological species of human beings. 
As a fundamental value, of course, dignity is not biological and cannot belong 
‘biologically’, since it belongs to the realm of the spirit as a motivating power 
characteristic of, or pertaining to, meaningful entities, in this case human beings.
Ratzinger seems to indicate as much when he states that ‘There are […] 
self-subsistent values that flow from the essence of what it is to be a man’27. 
I have argued elsewhere, using Stein’s account of values and her phenomenology 
in general, that Human Dignity refers to the judgement, implicitly accomplished 
in the expression, that human beings have dignity as such28. On this account, 
Stein, like Ratzinger, would regard Human Dignity to pertain to the essence of 
the human being, i.e. as the fundamental value of the human being, which ought 
to be recognised as such.
However, when Ratzinger goes on to say that Human Dignity ‘vanishes’ 
when man is ‘produced’29, then it seems to me that he underestimates the ideal 
existence of the value and therefore is led to think it goes away when it is not 
respected. That, of course, is not the case, if you understand values as Stein 
does, namely as objective or ideal motivating powers, which are not dependent 
on us for their motivating power, although they are dependent on us for their 
realisation. The objective ideality of the value is something Ratzinger does seem 
to be aware of when he locates the sacred mission to respect Human Dignity in 
a realm beyond time. He also explicitly talks about the real existence of values 
(in particular of the value of Human Dignity) before which we have responsibil-
ity and which establishes them as beyond our attempts at manipulation30. What 
is compromised when Human Dignity is not respected is the respect due to it, 
a respect that might well be incompatible with manipulation, and with bringing 
the human being into existence in conditions of manipulation. 
25 M. Lebech, On the Problem of Human Dignity. A Hermeneutical and Phenomenological 
Investigation, Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann 2009. 
26 J. Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, p. 42.
27 Ibid., p. 71.
28 M. Lebech, On the Problem of Human Dignity, Part III.
29 J. Ratzinger, Europe Today and Tomorrow, p. 94.
30 J. Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa?, p. 108-109.
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When Human Dignity is compromised, i.e. when it is not respected as a dig-
nity and instead subordinated to other values, the compromise, apart from re-
sulting in allowing physical or psychological destruction of the person not being 
respected, also affects the character of the one who violates Human Dignity. 
From here it contaminates the culture both by contagion and by providing a bad 
example and precedent. The suffering of the one whose dignity was violated, in 
contrast, itself testifies to the fundamental value of Human Dignity (ecce homo!). 
Far from preventing the value from motivating others, the ideal will continue to 
call and motivate whoever open him or herself to its motivating power, also 
when it meets them from the person whose dignity has been violated. What can 
and does prevent others being motivated is on the one hand contagion (operating 
unconsciously) and on the other peer pressure (operating through fear). It is the 
ideality of the fundamental value of human beings entitling them to respect that 
accounts for the fact that we cannot call Human Dignity a European idea, except 
in the sense that Europeans also have had it.
We cannot either claim it to be a Christian idea in the sense that it should rely 
on Christian doctrine or faith to be adequately conceptualised. It is possible that 
the Christian culture sociologically favours its being adequately conceptualised 
and respected. To establish this would be a matter of an empirical investigation, 
which would be very difficult to accomplish, the results of which would almost 
certainly be very controversial. That they would be controversial testifies to the 
fact that most people, whether Christian or not, owns the idea of Human Dignity 
as the moral standard that underpins the Human Rights tradition. None of these 
people are likely to be separated from the idea willingly.
However, Ratzinger wants to go deeper still. He wants to claim that faith 
in the Creator itself is more worthy of the human being than having no faith. 
That believing that the world comes from creative reason is more reasonable 
and more in accord with Human Dignity than the contrary. ‘Die grundlegende 
Alternative, vor die uns der Gang der Neuzeit stellt, besteht in der Frage: Steht 
am Anfang aller Dinge das Unvernunftige, ist die Unvernunft der eigentliche 
Ursprung der Welt, oder kommt sie aus der schöpferischen Vernunft? Glau-
ben heisst, die zweite Alternative ergreifen, und nur sie ist im tiefsten Sinn des 
Wortes „vernünftig“ und menschenwürdig‘31.
In many ways the modern human being does not dare to believe that it is 
possible to approach truth by our questioning at all. According to Ratzinger, 
however, ‘this false humility denigrates human beings; it makes action blind and 
feeling empty’32. We do need to be certain we can know what is true. Only the 
belief that the world is ordered and knowable, possibly underpinned by faith in 
the Word of God, can ground a claim or a mission to reign for the sake of Human 
31 J. Ratzinger, Wendezeit für Europa?, p. 77. 
32 Ibid., p. 78. My own translation.
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Dignity.33 The one who does not believe in the possibility of knowing principles 
would not come upon the idea of governing in accordance with them, except 
with a view to deceive others, since it is not possible to govern in accordance 
with principles you cannot know. That is why it is so important for Ratzinger to 
emphasise that Europe must export not only its technology and knowhow, but 
also its inner origin and meaning: the knowledge of the Logos as foundation for 
all things, which allows us a view of the true as a measure for the good34.
Ratzinger thus thinks that ideas, as well as actions, can be in accordance with 
Human Dignity and also be beneath it. He mentions for example the idea that 
the good could not be distinguished from material goods as one that would be 
beneath Human Dignity35. The good, and the common good, when conceived in 
accordance with Human Dignity, is not reducible to material goods: materialism 
is an ideology beneath Human Dignity.
That ideas can be in accordance with Human Dignity or contrary to it, is an 
idea Ratzinger attributes to Robert Spaemann. It is, despite its apparent obvious-
ness, quite an original idea. It explains why the teaching of ideologies such as 
Marxism and Positivism, without respect for their integration with culture and 
religion, can lead to resentment in those taught, as they feel their dignity and that 
which allowed for the deepest and most interior of the personal life of the soul 
has been taken away in the process36. ‘Permissivism’ can have the same effect, 
even when it is merely displayed, as in cinema37.
Ideas, which do not allow the human being to live in and from its innermost 
being and consequently are not in accordance with Human Dignity, prevent so-
ciety to be in its public and communal aspects a moral society. They institute 
a society in which that which gives the human being dignity and constitutes him 
as such does not count38.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that Europe, for Ratzinger, is a concept of political geography, 
identified by a mission to reign to protect Human Dignity. We have seen that this 
33 Ibid., p. 85. „Nicht wenige sind der Meinung, dass es lieber umgekehrt hätte gehen sollen, 
dass man Europa hätte befreien müssen vom Christentum und von dem Herrschaftsanspruch, den es 
aus seiner Wahrheitsgewissheit ableitet”. 
34 Ibid., p. 102.
35 Ibid., p. 101.
36 Ibid., p. 117.
37 Ibid., p. 121.
38 Ibid., p. 123.
 EUROPE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 245
mission is rooted in what does not pass and at the same time calls us to realise 
the value of Human Dignity by creating institutions to promote respect for it. 
We have also seen that understanding Human Dignity with Stein to be the fun-
damental value of human beings entitling them to respect, allows us to clarify 
the mission and therefore to distinguish it from what does not pertain to it by 
its essence. Furthermore, that the mission encourages faith in the Creator as an 
attitude in accordance with Human Dignity.
Europa i godność człowieka. 
Steinowska dyskusja a rozumienie Europy u Josepha Ratzingera 
 
Streszczenie
W niniejszym artykule omówiono refleksje Benedykta XVI dotyczące formowa-
nia się i historii Europy w świetle powierzonego człowiekowi zadania panowania, 
które jest nie tylko jego świętym obowiązkiem, ale także podstawą jego godności. 
Analizy dokonano w świetle poglądów Edyty Stein na temat związku między forma-
cją wspólnotową a obiektywnymi wartościami. Po pierwsze, zostały ukazane poglą-
dy Ratzingera na temat rozumienia Europy w wymiarze polityczno-geograficznym. 
Po drugie, omówiono misję formowania Europy w świetle refleksji Ratzingera oraz 
również według sugestii Stein. Misja taka będzie szczególnie odpowiednia dla kształ-
towania ludzi i kontynentu. W trzeciej części omówiono rozumienie godności czło-
wieka Ratzingera w świetle koncepcji wartości autorstwa Stein.
Słowa kluczowe:  godność człowieka, Joseph Ratzinger, Edith Stein, Jürgen 
Habermas, Europa, zadanie panowania.
Europe and Human Dignity.  
A Steinian discussion of Joseph Ratzinger’s understanding of Europe 
 
Summary
This article discusses Benedict the XVI’s charting of the formation and history of 
Europe around a mission to reign as a sacred duty for the sake of Human Dignity in 
the light of Edith Stein’s insights into the relationship between community formation 
and objective values. First, an account of Ratzinger’s understanding of Europe as 
a concept of political geography is given. Secondly is discussed the mission at the 
heart of the formation of Europe according to Ratzinger, and how such a mission 
would, according to Stein, be particularly suited for shaping a people and a continent. 
The third section discusses Ratzinger’s understanding of Human Dignity in the light 
of Stein’s understanding of values.
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Europa und menschliche Würde. 
Eine Steinsche Diskussion mit dem Joseph Ratzingers Verständnis vom Europa 
 
Zusammenfassung
Im Artikel wird eine Darstellung von Entstehung und Geschichte Europas im Zu-
sammenhang mit dem Herrschaftsauftrag unternommen, verstanden als eine heilige 
Pflicht um der menschlichen Würde willen im Lichte der Ausführungen von Edith 
Stein über den Zusammenhang zwischen der Bildung von Gemeinschaft und objek-
tiven Werten. Zuerst wird das Verständnis Ratzingers über Europa als ein Konzept 
der politischen Geographie dargelegt. Im Weiteren wird der Herrschaftsauftrag im 
Zentrum der Entstehung Europas gemäß den Ausführungen von Ratzinger diskutiert 
sowie die Frage, wie ein solcher Auftrag, nach Stein, besonders geeignet sein könnte, 
dem Menschen und dem Kontinent eine Gestalt zu verleihen.  Im dritten Teil wird 
das Ratzingersche Verständnis von der menschlichen Würde im Licht des Steinschen 
Verständnis der Werte dargelegt. 
Schlüsselworte:  menschliche Würde, Joseph Ratzinger, Edith Stein, Jürgen 
Habermas, Europa, Herrschaftsauftrag.
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